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Abstract 
Recent research has shown that memory illusions can successfully prime both children’s and 
adults’ performance on complex, insight-based problems (compound remote associates tasks 
or CRATs).  The current research aimed to clarify the locus of these priming effects.  Like 
before, Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists were selected to prime subsequent CRATs 
such that the critical lures were also the solution words to a subset of the CRATs participants 
attempted to solve.  Unique to the present research, recognition memory tests were used and 
participants were either primed during the list study phase, during the memory test phase, or 
both.  Across two experiments, primed problems were solved more frequently and 
significantly faster than unprimed problems.  Moreover, when participants were primed 
during the list study phase, subsequent solution times and rates were considerably superior to 
those produced by those participants who were simply primed at test.  Together, these are the 
first results to show that false-memory priming during encoding facilitates problem solving in 
both children and adults. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: False memory; DRM paradigm; Priming; Compound remote associates task;  
Spreading activation; Reasoning-remembering relationships.
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On the Adaptive Function of Children’s and Adults’ False Memories 
 
Memory is renowned for being fallible.  Errors of commission, or falsely 
“remembering” information that was never experienced, are among the most frequently 
encountered memory problems (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Zember, 2011; Gallo, 2010; Howe, 
Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Roediger, 1996).  To study these errors, researchers 
have turned to the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995).  Here, participants are presented with a list of words (e.g., nurse, 
medicine, hospital) that are all associates of a nonpresented but related concept, known as the 
critical lure (e.g., DOCTOR).  Research using this paradigm has found that: (1) in subsequent 
recall and recognition tests participants frequently yet incorrectly identify the nonpresented 
critical lure as having been present in the previously studied list, and (2) developmentally, 
younger children exhibit fewer false memories compared with older children and adults (e.g., 
Brainerd et al., 2011; Gallo, 2010; Howe et al., 2009). 
False memory illusions, including those produced by the DRM paradigm, are 
frequently viewed as being a negative consequence of a powerful, reconstructive memory 
system.  These negative consequences are not simply limited to misremembering items on 
lists, but extend to falsely remembering event-consistent objects or people that were not 
present during the original experience.  In extreme examples, people incorrectly recount 
earlier experiences as ones that they believed happened (e.g., being abducted by a UFO) when 
in fact no such event occurred (e.g., Otgaar, Candel, Merckelbach, & Wade, 2009).  Worse, 
such false memories can have serious personal costs, as in cases involving false accusations 
of sexual assault that lead to the conviction of innocent people (e.g., Howe, 2013). 
However, some recent research has suggested that there may be more positive 
consequences of false memory illusions (e.g., Howe, 2011; Howe & Derbish, 2010).  What 
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such studies have found is that false memories can and do behave in similar ways to true 
memories.  For example, McDermott (1997) and McKone and Murphy (2000) showed that 
false memories generated using the DRM paradigm could prime performance on related 
memory tasks using both implicit (e.g., stem completion) and explicit (e.g., stem-cued recall) 
memory measures.  Similar effects with fragment completion have been obtained with 
children (Diliberto-Macaluso, 2005).  These parallels prompted researchers to examine the 
possible beneficial effects false memories could have on other memory tasks, with the 
positive consequences of memory illusions quickly becoming apparent (for reviews, see 
Howe, 2011; Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011).   
Importantly, if false memories have positive consequences similar to those normally 
ascribed to true memories, then we should see these consequences across a variety of 
cognitive domains and not simply in other memory tasks.  One cognitive domain in which 
memory processes may play a key, supporting role is problem solving.  Historically, the 
dependence of problem solving on memory has been hotly debated (e.g., see Brainerd & 
Reyna, 1993, for claims regarding independence, and Howe, Rabinowitz, & Grant, 1993, for 
an opposing position).  The emerging consensus, however, is that successful problem solving 
is crucially dependent on a range of memory processes, including the recall of knowledge 
acquired through instruction and worked examples (e.g., Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005; Renkl, 
2002), the application of a “recognition heuristic” that can provide valid cues in decision 
making (e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Oppenheimer, 2003), 
and the transfer of analogous experiences to assist in attaining current goals (e.g., Bassok & 
Holyoak, 1989; Richland, Zur, & Holyoak, 2007).  
Although these latter memory processes appear to rely largely on direct or explicit 
retrieval there is also increasing acknowledgement that memory can influence problem 
solving and reasoning through intuitive processes operating indirectly or implicitly (e.g., 
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Evans, 2011; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011).  Such intuitive processes appear to have 
their basis either in tacitly learned associations (e.g., Osman & Stavy, 2006; Sloman, 1996) or 
in rules that have been deliberatively acquired but practiced to a state of automaticity (e.g., 
Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Research has also indicated that prior activation of specific 
knowledge structures can prime successful problem solving through implicit mechanisms.  
For example, Kokinov (1990; Kokinov & Pertov, 2001) showed that priming can facilitate 
performance with complex deductive, inductive, and analogical reasoning problems, 
benefitting both the strategy taken and the success/failure ratio.  Schunn and Dunbar (1996) 
corroborated these findings in an analogical problem solving paradigm, demonstrating that 
conceptual knowledge of one knowledge domain (biochemistry) can spontaneously influence 
complex reasoning in another, unrelated knowledge domain (molecular genetics) via implicit 
priming, leading to facilitated problem solving as measured through both accuracy and speed 
of solution generation.  Schunn and Dunbar’s sophisticated controls and measures also 
allowed the involvement of explicit memory processes to be ruled out as a cause of solution 
success in the priming conditions.   
Although previous research has confirmed that true memories can effectively prime 
solutions in problem solving tasks, the question remains as to whether memory illusions, 
which are also a product of our reconstructive memory system, can likewise prime solutions 
in such tasks.  That is, because false memories occur with some regularity, we can ask 
whether they are just a necessary and epiphenomenal evil that arises because of the 
reconstructive nature of remembering the past and trying to anticipate the future, or can they, 
like true memories, serve some fitness-relevant function?  Using implicitly generated 
information to solve problems is a key feature in many proposals concerning the nature of 
creative problem solving (Hélie & Sun, 2010) and, of course, false memories do come under 
the rubric of information that is generated automatically, outside of conscious awareness.  
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Indeed, implicit information may have an advantage over explicitly generated information in 
times of threat or stress (e.g., Porter & Leach, 2009) or when solving complex problems using 
“deliberation-without-attention” (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; 
Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  
As a first approximation to answering this question, we examined insight-based, 
creative problem solving (Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Howe, Garner, 
Dewhurst, & Ball, 2010).  Such problem solving is thought to involve spreading activation 
processes much like those that mediate the formation of spontaneous false memories in the 
DRM paradigm (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Mednick, 1962).  
Concerning the latter, both the associative-activation theory (Howe et al., 2009) and the 
activation-monitoring theory (Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001a) suggest that false 
memories are formed due to implicit activation of critical lures upon presentation of items on 
the DRM list.  Activation from list members spreads to other lexical items in memory, 
extending to the unpresented critical lure as well as to other unpresented items.  This 
activation can reverberate among items in memory (presented or not) as well as back from 
these unpresented items to items that were presented (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998).  Similarly, 
for insight-based problems, spreading activation mechanisms can be triggered when problem 
solvers encounter a concept (e.g., an item within an insight-based problem) and this activation 
assists problem solving inasmuch as it provides a preliminary search through the memory 
network for related concepts.  This search spreads to both related and unrelated concepts and 
continues until those concepts that are crucial to the problem solution become active and an 
insightful solution is achieved (Bowden et al., 2005; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004).   
Howe et al. (2010) were the first to carry out research investigating the role that false 
memories play in priming insight-based solutions using compound remote associates tasks 
(CRATs) (see Mednick, 1962; Sio, Monaghan, & Ormerod, 2013).  CRAT problems, 
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originally developed by Mednick (1962), involve the presentation of three words (e.g., apple, 
family, house), which can be associated by a common solution word (e.g., TREE).  Howe et 
al. (2010) presented adults with DRM lists whose critical lures served as potential primes for 
half of the subsequent CRAT problems that participants had to solve.  They found that when 
participants falsely recalled the critical lures of the studied DRM lists, the corresponding 
CRATs were solved more frequently and significantly faster than CRATs that had not been 
primed by DRM lists or CRATs that were primed but the critical lure had not been falsely 
recalled.   
Howe et al. (2011) extended this research to children.  They recruited both child (11-
year-olds) and adult participants (18-year-olds) and, using age-normed CRATs, found that 
regardless of age, CRATs were solved at a significantly higher rate and more quickly when 
the critical lures of the studied DRM lists had been falsely recalled compared with instances 
when the critical lures were not falsely recalled and instances when the CRATs had not been 
primed by prior DRM lists.  This research shows that like true memories, false memories can 
successfully prime higher-order cognitive tasks (i.e., insight-based problem solving).  
Moreover, this research challenges the view that false memory illusions are inherently 
maladaptive and, like false beliefs (McKay & Dennett, 2009), highlights the positive 
contributions of false memory illusions, namely the assistance they offer during complex 
problem solving.   
Because of the robust nature of this effect, it requires an adequate explanation that 
includes a clear depiction of the mechanisms that mediate memory-based priming effects in 
creative problem solving.  First, these findings are important in terms of theories of 
spontaneous false memory formation.  Indeed, they are consistent with the false memory 
theories mentioned earlier that invoke spreading activation mechanisms (e.g., AAT, Howe et 
al., 2009).  This is because false memories that have been activated during DRM list 
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presentation are still above threshold in memory when participants are trying to solve CRAT 
problems.  That is, solving CRATs becomes easier because spread of activation from the 
CRAT terms to the critical lure (or problem solution) is faster given that the critical lure is 
already active in memory.  Indeed, problem solving is dependent on false memory activation 
levels because solution times are faster and solution rates higher when participants falsely 
remember the critical lure than when they do not.  Other models of false memory that do not 
involve spreading activation mechanisms may have more difficulty accounting for these 
findings.  For example, fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1993) suggests that false 
memories rely on the extraction of gist (or meaning) traces and not on the spread of activation 
within memory.  Given the absence of contradictory information (e.g., verbatim traces), items 
that are consistent with the extracted gist may be falsely remembered along with actually 
presented information during recall or recognition tests.  It is clear that fuzzy-trace theory can 
account for the fact that the term SWEET may be falsely remembered when the DRM list 
sour, sugar, bitter, … cake, tart has been presented as it is consistent with the gist (e.g., 
“things that are sweet”).  However, it is less clear that this gist is consistent with the solution 
to the corresponding CRAT problem involving the terms heart, shop, and tooth.  Indeed, gist 
having to do with “love” may be more appropriate to the solution SWEETheart.  In fact, in 
some cases, the gist extracted from DRM lists may be more of a hindrance (e.g., interfere 
with) than of assistance when it comes to solving some of the CRAT problems. 
1
 
Second, Howe et al. (2010, 2011) argued that this priming effect occurred during the 
encoding of the DRM lists (i.e., at study) and not during retrieval (i.e., on the recall test).  
This assumption is generally consistent with the DRM literature that shows that critical lures 
tend to be generated at encoding and not during retrieval (e.g., Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & 
Thorley, 2009; Dewhurst, Knott, & Howe, 2011).  However, there is a problem with this latter 
conclusion.  Specifically, Howe et al. (2010, 2011) had shown that priming of problem 
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solutions only occurred when participants had falsely recalled the critical lures during the 
memory test.  What this means is that to determine whether participants had falsely 
remembered the critical lure, a memory test was necessary.  Of course, once a memory test is 
administered, it is difficult to say unambiguously that priming occurred during study because 
it is equally plausible that it occurred during the test itself. 
To solve this problem, Howe et al. (2010, 2011) conducted a second experiment in 
which no memory test was administered.  That is, participants simply studied the DRM lists 
and then solved CRAT problems, effectively eliminating the testing confound.  Given that 
they used the same DRM lists and CRATs in this second experiment as in the first, if priming 
occurred during encoding then similar percentages of false memories would be anticipated in 
this second experiment, despite the absence of the memory test, and thus similar advantages 
should have been observed in CRAT solution rates and times.  This is exactly what they 
found.  That is, CRATs that had been primed with DRM lists were solved more frequently 
and more rapidly (at rates and times commensurate with those observed in their first 
experiments) than CRATs that had not been primed.  It would seem, then, that false memory 
priming of CRATs occurs at encoding and not during retrieval tests. 
Given that these robust findings are not just novel but also have important theoretical 
implications, particularly in terms of understanding the locus of false memory effects and how 
they serve as primes for subsequent problem solving, it is imperative that they generalize to 
other indices of remembering (i.e., recognition as well as recall) and are not subject to 
alternative interpretations. Unfortunately, Howe et al.’s (2010, 2011) design and measurement 
changes may not provide an optimal solution to determining the locus of false memory 
priming effects in problem solving.  Although the testing confound was eliminated, Howe and 
colleagues were no longer able to measure false memory strength, hence the effectiveness of 
the prime, using a memory test.  That is, because the priming of problem solving requires the 
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false recollection of the critical lure, some sort of memory test is needed to confirm whether 
false recollection has occurred for specific primes.  More importantly, eliminating the 
memory test does not enable an assessment of test-induced priming effects or for the 
magnitude of these effects to be contrasted with those found at study.   
Because it is important to provide a clear and convincing demonstration that false 
memories can and do have positive consequences on human cognition, in the current article, 
we resolve the problems associated with previous research so that the demonstration and 
meaning of these positive effects is not compromised by competing interpretations.  We do 
this by switching to a recognition measure rather than a recall measure.  Thus, in the present 
research, we assigned participants to one of three conditions: one in which priming, thus 
activation of the critical lure, can occur during both study and test (the ‘Study and Test’ 
condition in which relevant DRM lists are studied and a recognition test that includes the 
critical lures is used to gather data during the test phase); one in which priming, thus 
activation of the critical lure, can only occur during the study phase (the ‘Study Only’ 
condition in which relevant DRM lists are studied but there is no recognition test); and one in 
which priming, thus activation of the critical lure, can only occur during memory testing (the 
‘Test Only’ condition in which CRAT-irrelevant DRM lists are studied but the recognition 
test includes the CRAT-relevant critical lures).   
This design has three advantages.  First, it overcomes the memory test confound, 
given that the ‘Study only’ condition does not include a memory test.  Second, it permits the 
conditionalizing of CRAT solutions into those solved with and without false recollection of 
the critical lure using the ‘Study and Test’ condition.  Third, the ‘Test Only’ condition 
provides a new condition in which we can estimate the impact of seeing the critical lure only 
at test.  Consequently, this design permits an evaluation of whether the activation of the 
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critical lure during encoding (‘Study Only’), during retrieval (‘Test Only’), or both (‘Study 
and Test’) is important to priming CRAT solutions.   
We predicted that when false memories do occur, the primed CRAT problems should 
be solved more often and more rapidly than the unprimed CRAT problems and than primed 
problems where no false recollection occurred.  Furthermore, if activation of the critical lure 
at study (i.e., encoding) is the key to enhanced CRAT performance, then it is expected that the 
solution times and rates will be approximately equal across the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study 
Only’ conditions, but lower and slower in the ‘Test Only’ condition and for the unprimed 
CRATs.  Alternatively, if the presence of the critical lure at test (i.e., retrieval) contributes to 
enhancing CRAT performance (where this effect is predicted to be smaller than the effect of 
priming at study), then solution times and rates are expected to be faster and greater in the 
‘Study and Test’ condition compared with the ‘Study Only’ condition, which in turn will have 
faster and greater solution times and rates compared with the ‘Test Only’ condition, which in 
turn will have faster and greater solution times and rates compared with the unprimed 
CRATs. 
To examine these hypotheses, we conducted two experiments.  In the first experiment, 
we used a subset of some newly created and normed CRAT problems (see Appendix A), 
along with their corresponding DRM lists, to provide a “proof of concept” for false memory 
priming effects using the newly devised recognition paradigm with adult participants.  In 
Experiment 2, we examined the comparability of these findings to those of previous research 
that had used recall rather than recognition as a measure of false memory by using identical 
CRAT-DRM pairings to Howe et al. (2011).  We were also interested in whether our 
recognition paradigm, like the recall one used previously, produced similar effects in children 
and adults.  Therefore, we tested children (11-year-olds) and adults (20-year-olds) using the 
same age-appropriate CRATs deployed in earlier studies involving recall as the measure of 
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false memories (Howe et al., 2011).  As in this previous research, although adults may exhibit 
more false memories than children, our central concern was whether children’s and adults’ 
priming effects are similar given problem-solving tasks equated for relative difficulty.  That 
is, we used age-appropriate CRAT problems because we were interested in whether we could 
attenuate (or eliminate) age differences in problem-solving rates by using age-appropriate 
problems.  Thus, age differences in problem difficulty were not, in and of themselves, of 
interest in this study.  Rather, we wondered whether false memories could serve the same 
priming function for children as they do for adults when problem difficulty was equated 
across age and whether the locus of these priming effects were developmentally invariant. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 48 university students participated in this experiment.   
Design, Materials, and Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three between-participants 
conditions: ‘Study and Test’, where participants studied DRM lists, were given a 30 sec 
distractor task (letter search), followed by a recognition test, and finally solved CRAT 
problems; ‘Study Only’, where participants studied DRM lists, were given a filler task, and 
then solved CRAT problems; and ‘Test Only’, where participants studied CRAT-irrelevant 
DRM lists, were given a 30 sec distractor task (letter search), followed by a recognition test 
containing CRAT-relevant but unstudied critical lures, and then solved CRAT problems.  All 
participants were primed on half the CRATs but not the other half.  Both the order of the 
DRM lists and CRATs were counterbalanced to eliminate order effects. 
Ten CRATs (ARMY, BLACK, FLAG, GIRL, HEALTH, LONG, RUBBER, 
SMOKE, SPIDER, and WINDOW) were selected from normative data reported in Appendix 
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A and were taken from the medium difficulty range (between 20% to 78% solution rate).  Ten 
corresponding DRM lists were used, each of which consisted of 10 associates of the critical 
lure.  These lists were split into two sets of five, so participants would be primed with half the 
DRM lists, while completing all 10 of the CRATs.  Each set was balanced for solution rate 
difficulty and the DRM lists were equated for backward associative strength.  
 Two recognition tests were created with items used on these tests being condition 
dependent.  For the ‘Study and Test’ condition, items consisted of the five critical lures from 
the studied DRM lists, five unstudied and unrelated critical lures, 32 true items from the 
studied DRM lists, 32 foils unrelated to studied DRM lists, and eight filler items.  For the 
‘Test Only’ condition, items consisted of five critical lures that were not studied but were 
CRAT solutions, five critical lures for the irrelevant DRM lists that were studied but were not 
CRAT solutions, 32 true items corresponding to the irrelevant DRM lists, 32 foils unrelated to 
the studied DRM lists and the subsequent CRAT problems, and eight filler items.  No 
associates to the critical lures that were CRAT solutions were included, to ensure that no false 
memories for these items were created at test.  No recognition test was needed for the ‘Study 
Only’ condition.  Instead, a filler task (a letter search task) was used that took the same time 
to complete as the distractor and recognition tasks in the other conditions. 
 In the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions participants were given five out 
of the 10 DRM lists in a randomized order on a computer screen.  Participants in the ‘Test 
Only’ condition were given five irrelevant DRM lists to study.  This was followed by a 
distractor task (letter search) and the appropriate recognition test, to which the participants 
gave their response verbally.  Participants were then asked to complete all 10 CRATs.  
Participants were first given an example, followed by two practice CRATs, before the test 
CRATs were presented.  Each CRAT was presented on a computer screen, in a randomized 
order, and participants were asked to provide a solution verbally.  If participants failed to 
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correctly solve a CRAT, they were given feedback as to the correct answer after each 
problem.  Solutions were timed and participants were given a maximum of one minute to 
complete each problem. 
Results and Discussion 
 Both the mean CRAT solution rates (proportion correctly solved) and the mean CRAT 
solution times (seconds) were analyzed using separate 2(Priming: primed vs. unprimed) x 3 
(Condition: study and test vs. study only vs. test only) analyses of variance (ANOVA).  For 
solution rates, there was a main effect of priming, F(1, 45) = 12.00, p < .01 , η
2
p = .21, where 
the mean CRAT solution rate was higher when participants were primed (M = .64, SE = .03) 
than when they were not primed (M = .52, SE = .03).  There was no significant main effect of 
condition [F(1, 45) = 2.53, p = .09, η
2
p = .10] but there was a significant Priming x Condition 
interaction, F(2, 45) = 5.09, p = .01, η
2
p = .18 (see Figure 1).  A simple main effects analysis 
with Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons showed that there were no differences across 
conditions for unprimed CRATs [M = .45 (SE = .06), M = .60 (SE = .05), and M = .54 (SE = 
.05) for the ‘Study and Test, “Study Only”, and ‘Test Only’ conditions respectively) but for 
primed CRATs the ‘Study and Test’ (M = .66, SE = .05) and ‘Study Only’ conditions (M = 
.74, SE = .05), which did not differ, were superior to the ‘Test Only’ Condition (M = .51, SE = 
.05), F(2, 45) = 4.94,  p = .01 , η
2
p = .18.  For solution times, the ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of priming, F(1, 45) = 16.37,  p  < .01, η
2
p = .27, where the mean CRAT solution times 
were lower when participants were primed (M = 31.01 sec, SE = 1.75) than when they were 
not primed (M = 37.01 sec, SE = 1.66).  There was no significant main effect of condition 
[F(2, 45) = 1.95,  p  = .15, η
2
p = .08] and no Priming x Condition interaction [F(2, 45) = 1.26,  
p  = .29, η
2
p = .05].  
Although average false memory rates were 70%, there were a number of cases in 
which participants did not falsely recognize the critical lure when primed.  To examine 
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whether priming in the ‘Study and Test’ condition was contingent on false recognition of the 
critical lures, solution rates and times were conditionalized on whether the participant had 
falsely recognized the critical lure during testing.  More specifically, the primed CRAT 
problem responses were separated into those solved with a false memory and those solved 
without a false memory.  Those with false memories were then compared to those without 
false memories using paired t-tests.  For solution rates, the t-test was significant, t(15) = 2.36, 
p < .05, where participants who were primed and had a false memory solved more CRATs (M 
= .66, SD = .32, MSE = .08) than those who were primed and had no false memory (M = .39, 
SD = .42, MSE = .10).  Importantly, this latter solution rate did not differ from unprimed 
CRAT solution rates.  For solution times, the t-test revealed that participants who were 
primed and had a false memory solved CRATs more quickly (M = 31.45 sec, SD = 14.65, 
MSE = 3.66) than those who were primed and had no false memory (M = 43.08 sec, SD = 
21.25, MSE = 5.31), although this difference only approached significance (t(15) = -2.02, p = 
.06).  Like solution rates, solution times for those who were primed but did not falsely 
recognize the critical lure did not differ from unprimed CRAT solution times. 
Together, these results are the first to show that the effects of false memory priming 
on problem solving performance are greatest when the critical lure primes are induced during 
the study phase as opposed to being presented at test.  That is, solution rates and solution 
times were better when priming occurred in the ‘Study and Test’ or ‘Study Only’ conditions 
relative to the ‘Test Only’ condition.  Consistent with the general literature on the locus of 
false memories, critical lures become active during the encoding process and can serve to 
prime performance on other tasks [“superadditive priming” (Hancock, Hicks, & Marsh, 
2003)].  In our case, this other task involves higher cognitive processes, namely, problem 
solving.  Moreover, these effects are strongest for participants whose false memory activation 
is sufficiently strong to produce false recognition of the critical lure during testing.  Critically, 
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however, the priming advantage was no greater in the ‘Study and Test’ condition than in the 
‘Study Only’ condition, a finding that indicates that the addition of a recognition test did not 
contribute to the overall priming effect.  Before theoretical implications of these findings are 
considered, we examine whether these findings hold across different CRAT problems and 
generalize across age. 
Experiment 2 
 Having established false memory priming effects for adults’ creative problem solving 
in this new recognition memory paradigm, we can now turn to an experiment in which we test 
the generalizability of these findings.  Specifically, we examine whether these effects extend 
to children by using the same CRAT-DRM pairings that were used successfully in a similar 
priming experiment (but one that used recall, not recognition, as a measure of false memory) 
with children and adults (Howe et al., 2011). 
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-six children (M = 10.9 years, SD = .4 years; 21 females) and 36 adults (M = 
20.3 years, SD = 2.3 years; 20 females) participated in the experiment.  All were fluent in 
English.  Child participants were recruited from a predominantly White, middle-class school.  
Prior to the experiment, written informed consent was obtained from the adult participants 
and written informed parental consent was obtained for all child participants.  In addition, the 
assent of each participant was provided on the day of testing. 
 Design, Materials, and Procedure 
 A 2(Age: 11-year-olds vs. 20-year-olds) x 3(Condition: study and test vs. study only 
vs. test only) x 2(Priming: primed vs. unprimed) design was used, where the first two factors 
were between-participants and the latter factor was within participant.  For the 11-year-old 
participants, eight CRATs were chosen from the child normative data produced by Howe et 
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al. (2011; see Appendix B in the current article).  For the adult participants, eight CRATs 
were selected from the normative data in Appendix A and from the Bowden and Jung-
Beeman norms (2003; see Appendix C in the current article).  In addition, 16 DRM lists were 
selected for use in the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions: eight for use with the 
11-year-old participants and eight for use with the adult participants (see Appendixes B and 
C, respectively).  DRM lists were selected from Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999) as 
well as from the Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (2004) norms.  Each of the 16 DRM lists 
contained the top 10 items in backward associative strength and was presented in descending 
order of associative strength to the critical lure.  The eight DRM lists studied by the 11-year-
old participants and the eight DRM lists studied by the adult participants were randomly 
divided into two sets of four and counterbalanced across participants, so that all CRATs were 
primed an equal number of times within each age group.   
An additional eight DRM lists were selected for use in the ‘Test Only’ condition (see 
Appendixes B and C).  These eight lists were unrelated to the 16 DRM lists used in the ‘Study 
and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions, as well as the 16 CRATs.  The eight unrelated DRM 
lists were chosen from Stadler et al. (1999) and the same lists were used for both 11-year-old 
participants and adults (lists were selected that were suitable for both the children and adults).   
In addition to the selected CRATs and the DRM lists, a series of eight recognition 
tests were constructed.  Four of these recognition tests were used in the ‘Study and Test’ 
condition, two of which were specific to the child participants and two of which were specific 
to the adult participants.  The other four recognition tests were constructed for use in the ‘Test 
Only’ condition.  Each recognition test consisted of 56 items: the four unpresented critical 
lure primes; six presented items from each of the four DRM lists studied, three of which were 
high associates of the critical lure and three of which were low associates of the critical lure; 
four unpresented but related items, one for each of the four DRM lists studied (these were 
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typically the 14
th
 or the 15
th
 item from the original DRM lists and we included these items as 
a measure of false memories for weak associates: see Stadler et al., 1999; Nelson et al., 2004); 
and 24 filler items, which were three items chosen at random from eight completely unrelated 
DRM lists, randomly selected from Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001b).   
All participants were tested individually in a quiet, unoccupied room.  As in 
Experiment 1, the procedure differed depending upon the condition that the participant had 
been assigned to.  Participants randomly assigned to the ‘Study and Test’ condition received 
general memory instructions that informed them that they would be verbally presented with 
four lists, one after the other, and that they should listen carefully to each list.  Participants 
were subsequently presented with one set of four DRM lists in a randomized order.  A 
distractor task (a letter search task) was then administered for a period of 30 sec.  Following 
the distractor task was a 56-item recognition test.  Finally, participants completed a set of 
eight CRAT problems.  Participants were first provided with an example CRAT followed by a 
practice CRAT, which they had to solve correctly in order to advance on to the eight test 
CRATs.  The example CRAT, the practice CRAT, and each of the eight test CRATs were 
presented on a computer screen as well as being read aloud by the experimenter.  Participants 
provided a verbal response to the CRATs.  Participants had a maximum of 60 sec to complete 
the practice CRAT and had a maximum of 60 sec per each of the eight test CRATs.  Any test 
CRAT that was not solved within the 60 sec was classified as being unsolved and participants 
were given feedback on the correct answer before advancing on to the next test CRAT.  The 
order of presentation of the CRATs was randomized for each participant.  Solution times were 
measured from the presentation of the word problem to the time at which the correct solution 
was given.   
Participants randomly assigned to the ‘Study Only’ condition were also given general 
memory instructions to begin; participants were informed that they would be read aloud four 
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word lists, one after the other, and that they should listen carefully to each word list that was 
to be presented.  Participants were then presented with one set of four DRM lists in a 
randomized order followed by a distractor task for a period of 210 sec, a time that equalled 
the average amount of time taken to present the 56-item recognition test and carry out the 
distractor task for a period of 30 sec, in the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Test Only’ conditions.  This 
was done to ensure that the delay interval between list presentation and CRAT testing was 
constant across all between-participant conditions.  The CRATs followed the distractor task; 
the same procedure was used here as in the ‘Study and Test’ condition.   
In the final ‘Test Only’ condition, the testing procedure was equivalent to that in the 
‘Study and Test’ condition with the sole exception of the stimuli that were presented to the 
participants; the DRM lists in the ‘Test Only’ condition were completely unrelated (thus 
irrelevant) to the later CRATs.   
Results and Discussion 
In line with Experiment 1, both the mean CRAT solution rates (proportion correctly solved) 
and the mean CRAT solution times (seconds) were analyzed using separate 2(Age: 11- vs. 20-
year-olds) x 3(Condition: study and test vs. study only vs. test only) x 2(Priming: primed vs. 
unprimed) analyses of variance (ANOVA). 
Solution Rates 
 There was a significant main effect of priming, F(1, 66) = 87.62, p < .001, η²p = .57, 
where solution rates were higher for primed CRATs (M = .82, SE = .02) than unprimed 
CRATs (M = .56, SE = .03).  There was also a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 66) = 
8.09, p = .001, η²p = .20, where post-hoc tests revealed that solution rates were higher in the 
‘Study and Test’ (M = .79, SE = .04) and the ‘Study Only’ (M = .71, SE = .04, p > .05) 
conditions, which did not differ, compared with the ‘Test Only’ condition (M = .57, SE = .04, 
p < .001 and p < .05, respectively).  Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of age, 
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F(1, 66) = 6.42, p < .05, η²p = .09, where children exhibited higher solution rates for the 
CRATs than the adults (M = .75, SE = .03, and  M =.63, SE = .03 respectively).  This finding 
was unexpected given that age-normed stimuli were used.  However, although the age effect 
was statistically significant, the difference between the children’s and adults’ solution rates 
was small (.12).  Furthermore, there is an obvious explanation as to why there was an age 
effect in the unexpected direction; the CRATs selected for use with the children had an 
average normed solution rate of 54%, whereas the CRATs selected for use with the adults had 
a lower average solution rate of 45%.  Therefore, the children’s CRATs were simply easier to 
solve to begin with compared to the adults’ CRATs.
2 
 
Additionally, there was a significant Priming x Condition interaction, F(2, 66) = 6.77, 
p < .01, η²p = .17.  A simple main effects analysis with Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise 
comparisons showed that the solution rates for the primed CRAT problems were higher than 
the solution rates for the unprimed CRAT problems, regardless of the condition.  The source 
of the Priming x Condition interaction was in terms of the magnitude of these effects (see 
Figure 2).  The primed and unprimed solution rates in the ‘Study and Test’ condition were .94 
(SE = .03) and .64 (SE = .05) respectively, which was a significant difference of .30 (p < 
.001).  The primed and unprimed solution rates in the ‘Study Only’ condition were .89 (SE = 
.03) and .54 (SE = .07) respectively, which was a significant difference of .35 (p < .001).  The 
primed and unprimed solution rates in the ‘Test Only’ condition were .63 (SE = .05) and .51 
(SE = .05) respectively, which was a significant difference of .12 (p < .01).  A quantitative 
difference was therefore evident between the primed CRAT solution rates and the unprimed 
CRAT solution rates across the three conditions; the difference between the primed and 
unprimed CRAT solution rates for the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions was 
quantitatively larger (by a factor of three) than the difference between the primed and 
unprimed CRAT solution rates in the ‘Test Only’ condition (see Figure 2).  That is, both the 
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‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions showed a 30% to 35% gain for primed versus 
unprimed CRAT solution rates, whereas the ‘Test Only’ condition showed only a modest 12% 
gain for primed versus unprimed CRAT solution rates.  Thus, although minor improvements 
in CRAT solution rates were observed when the CRAT solution words were physically 
presented to the participants at test (i.e., the solution words were included as part of the 
recognition test of memory) prior to them completing the eight test CRATs, the gains from 
having generated the solution words at study, prior to completing the eight test CRATs, were 
threefold greater. 
Solution Times 
 There was a significant main effect of priming, F(1, 66) = 70.35, p < .001, η²p = .52, 
where solution times were quicker for the primed CRATs (M = 21.13 sec, SE = 1.03) 
compared with the unprimed CRATs (M = 29.39 sec, SE = 1.20).  In addition, there was a 
significant main effect of condition, F(2, 66) = 12.98, p < .001, η²p = .28, and post-hoc tests 
showed that the solution times were quickest in the ‘Study and Test’ condition (M = 18.96 
sec, SE = 1.74), followed by the ‘Study Only’ condition (M = 25.37 sec, SE = 1.74), which 
both produced quicker solution times compared with the ‘Test Only’ condition (M = 31.45 
sec, SE = 1.74,).  There was no main effect of age [F(1, 66) = .26, p = .61, η²p = .00], where 
the average time taken to solve a CRAT was 24.75 sec (SE = 1.42) for children and 25.77 sec 
(SE = 1.42) for adults.   
Additionally, there was a significant Priming x Condition interaction, F(2, 66) = 6.51, 
p < .01, η²p = .17.  A simple main effects analysis with Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise 
comparisons showed that the solution times for the primed CRATs were faster than the 
solution times for the unprimed CRATs regardless of the condition.  Again, the source of the 
Priming x Condition interaction was in terms of the magnitude of these effects (see Figure 3).  
The primed and unprimed solution times for the ‘Study and Test’ condition were 13.50 sec 
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(SE = 1.21) and 24.42 sec (SE = 2.09) respectively, which was a significant difference of 
10.92 sec (p < .001).  The primed and unprimed solution times for the ‘Study Only’ condition 
were 20.07 sec (SE = 1.91) and 30.68 sec (SE = 1.80) respectively, which was a significant 
difference of 10.61 sec (p < .001).  The primed and unprimed solution times for the ‘Test 
Only’ condition were 29.84 sec (SE = 2.10) and 33.07 sec (SE = 2.22)  respectively, which 
was a significant difference of 3.23 sec (p < .05).  A quantitative difference was therefore 
evident between the primed CRAT solution times and the unprimed CRAT solution times 
across the three conditions; the difference between the primed and unprimed CRAT solution 
times in the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions was quantitatively greater (by a 
factor of three) than the difference between the primed and unprimed CRAT solution times in 
the ‘Test Only’ condition (see Figure 3).  That is, there was a reduction in CRAT solution 
times of around 11 sec for primed versus unprimed CRATs in both the ‘Study and Test’ and 
‘Study Only’ conditions, whereas the reduction was only approximately three sec for primed 
versus unprimed CRATs in the ‘Test Only’ condition.  Hence, although there was a slight 
increment in performance (i.e., faster solution times were produced) when participants were 
physically presented with the solution words on a recognition memory test prior to them 
solving the eight test CRATs, the gains from inducing the solution words at study, prior to 
them completing the eight test CRATs, were also threefold greater. 
Given that the false memory rates of the participants in the ‘Study and Test’ condition 
were recorded, as in Experiment 1, CRAT performance could be further conditionalized by 
separating the CRATs into (a) primed CRAT problems solved where the false memory was 
produced (primed/FM), (b) primed CRAT problems solved where the false memory was not 
produced (primed/No-FM), and (c) the unprimed CRAT problems that were solved.  
However, because false memory rates in the ‘Study and Test’ condition were close to ceiling 
for both age groups, as seen in the analyses of the ‘Study and Test’ condition performance 
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earlier, we reanalyzed the data using only nonceiling participants from the ‘Study and Test’ 
condition.   
There were two important outcomes concerning these reanalyses.  First, the same 
pattern of results was obtained when only nonceiling participants were included in the 
analyses already reported.  Second, when we conditionalized CRAT performance on the basis 
of false recognition rates for the ‘Study and Test’ participants’ solution rates, there was a 
significant main effect for priming, F(2, 20) = 5.09, p < .02, η²p = .46.  Post-hoc tests (p < .05) 
showed that those who were primed and falsely recognized the critical lure solved more 
CRATs (M = .93, SD = .08, MSE = .02) than those who were primed and did not falsely 
recognize the critical lure (M = .50, SD = .38, MSE = .07). 
General Discussion 
Clearly, false memories like true memories can have positive consequences when it 
comes to children’s and adults’ cognitive processes.  The present research provides a 
convincing demonstration that false memories can serve as effective primes when children 
and adults are attempting to solve problems, particularly ones that require insight-based 
solutions.  Thus, that false memories are an aspect of a flexible, reconstructive memory 
system does not necessarily mean that the consequences of memory illusions are negative.  
Indeed, as shown here, depending on the context in which false memories occur, they can and 
do exert a very positive influence on human cognition (cf. Howe, 2011; Schacter et al., 2011). 
Equally important, the findings that have emerged from the present research allow us 
to “drill down” into some of the mechanisms that are responsible for these positive effects of 
false memories.  Specifically, these results establish that the effects of priming on problem 
solving performance are greatest when the critical lure primes are induced during the study 
phase as opposed to being presented at test.  Across both experiments, these priming effects 
were robust and their encoding locus consistent with our predictions.  Moreover, this research 
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is the first to generalize previous findings where recall measures were used to evaluate 
memory performance (Howe et al., 2010, 2011) to memory measures involving tests of 
recognition.  Indeed, regardless of the memory measure being used, priming insight-based 
problem solutions, either through the prior presentation of DRM lists whose critical lures are 
also the solutions to the subsequent problems, or through the inclusion of critical lure primes 
on a recognition test of memory, significantly increases solution rates and quickens solution 
times relative to unprimed problem solution rates and times.  This adds to the growing 
consensus that false memories, like true memories, can successfully prime higher cognitive 
processes, at least in terms of problems involving insight-based solutions.   
Moreover, our research has clearly shown that false memory priming effects are 
developmentally invariant.  We demonstrated this in two ways.  First, priming effects were 
equally robust in both child and adult populations.  That is, when age appropriate materials 
were used, the magnitudes of these priming effects were similar in children and in adults.  
Second, the locus of these priming effects did not differ with age with the bulk of these effects 
occurring at encoding.  This developmental invariance is important theoretically.  That is, our 
results demonstrate that despite well-known age differences in true and false memory rates 
(where children routinely produce fewer true and false memories than adults – see Brainerd et 
al., 2011, Howe et al., 2009), once a false memory is produced, it can have the same 
facilitating effect on subsequent problem solving regardless of age.  Thus, the same spreading 
activation mechanism may drive reasoning-remembering dependencies in children as it does 
in adults. 
At a more fine-grained level, the outcomes of the present research support the 
predictions that primed CRATs would be solved more frequently and at a faster rate than 
unprimed CRATs.  Furthermore, it was hypothesized that if encoding was the primary site of 
priming CRAT performance, then the solution times and rates would be reasonably equal 
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across the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions, which in turn would be superior to 
the solution times and rates generated by participants in the ‘Test Only’ condition and to the 
solution times and rates generated in response to the unprimed CRATs.  The findings from the 
present research confirmed these predictions.  Moreover, the difference between the solution 
times and rates for primed versus unprimed CRATs was considerably greater for both 
children and adults in Experiment 2 in the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions 
compared to the ‘Test Only’ condition.  What this means is that generation of critical lures 
during DRM list presentation (i.e., at encoding) is more effective at priming subsequent 
CRAT problems than explicitly presenting participants with the critical lure primes during a 
recognition test of memory (i.e., at test).  Consequently, the findings that have emerged from 
the present study show that priming at study is the key to facilitating CRAT performance, as 
opposed to priming at test.   
 The critical reader might come to the conclusion that the interpretation of the results 
from Experiments 1 and 2 is not as straightforward as we contend.  Such readers might argue 
that both of these experiments suffer from a potential confound.  Specifically, perhaps the 
different conditions used to dissever the locus of priming effects were confounded with 
differential levels of exposure to potential primes.  For example, the ‘Study and Test’ 
condition might prime CRATs the most simply because participants were exposed to more 
priming items during the procedure.  That is, participants in this condition were exposed to 
the 10-item DRM list (where each list item could be considered a weak prime) as well as a 
subset of these items again on the recognition test and the critical lure.  In addition, the ‘Study 
Only’ condition might prime CRATs better than the ‘Test Only’ condition simply due to the 
fact that participants in the former condition were exposed to the 10 weak primes at encoding 
(the items on the each CRAT-relevant DRM list) but participants in the latter condition were 
only exposed to a subset of those items (and the critical lure) during testing.  According to this 
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argument, any conditionwise differences in priming could be due to the stage at which 
priming took place (encoding vs. retrieval), the amount of exposure to items directly and 
indirectly related to the CRAT solutions, or both. 
 The problem with this “pure exposure” argument is that it reduces to one about the 
role of testing.  Specifically, because participants in both the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study 
Only’ conditions were exposed to the same 10-item DRM lists during encoding, the only 
other exposure differences must be localized at test.  Whereas participants in the ‘Study Only’ 
condition received no additional exposure to the CRAT-relevant critical lure or the related 
DRM list items, participants in the ‘Study and Test’ condition, like those in the ‘Test Only’ 
condition, were exposed to a subset of those list items on the recognition test as well as the 
critical lure.  What is clear from the data is that mere exposure to these additional items 
during a recognition test (the ‘Study and Test’ condition) did not enhance priming levels 
above that of exposure during ‘Study Only.’  Although there was some evidence of priming 
effects in the ‘Test Only’ condition, the effects due to exposure at study swamped any effects 
observed from exposure at testing.  Consistent with these findings is other recent evidence 
showing that effects of tests (i.e., test-induced priming) are small relative to the effects of 
study when it comes to false memory generation, for both children (Dewhurst, Howe, Berry, 
& Knott, 2012) and adults (Dewhurst et al., 2011).  Overall, then, it would seem that any 
potential confound between locus of exposure (study vs. test) and amount of exposure does 
not pose a serious problem and is not, therefore, a source of concern when it comes to 
interpreting the outcomes of these experiments.  Indeed, it would seem safe to conclude that 
like the generation of false memories themselves, the primary locus of false memory priming 
effects lies at encoding, not retrieval. 
More generally, we would argue that these priming effects, like most priming effects, 
occur relatively automatically outside of conscious awareness.  However, it is always possible 
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that participants may have used a more explicit strategy when solving CRATs.  That is, 
despite presenting the memory and reasoning tasks to participants as being unrelated, there is 
a possibility that some of the participants figured out that the tasks were connected.  If 
participants did become aware of this relationship, such awareness could have influenced how 
they went about solving the CRATs – that is, they would be more likely to try to remember 
previously presented items from the study or test sessions to solve them.  Of course, this 
strategy would greatly benefit the Study and Test and Study Only conditions because those 
lists had many items related to the critical lure that could enhance the likelihood of the lure 
itself being remembered.  In the Test Only condition, participants may also become aware of 
the fact that the solutions to the CRATs were linked to the items they were tested on but these 
would be harder to access because there would be fewer related cues.  Moreover, an explicit 
memory search strategy of this nature would both increase accessibility for studied/tested 
words and critical lures as CRAT solutions while at the same time make it difficult to find the 
solution for unprimed items because no matter how hard they search memory for the previous 
study items, the answer is not in episodic memory for the previously studied materials.  
Although the use of such a deliberate strategy is perhaps less likely in children than 
adults, we believe this explanation cannot account for these effects more generally for at least 
two reasons.  First, care was taken to ensure that participants did not believe that the memory 
task and CRATs were related.  The study title, description, and instructions to participants 
explicitly stated that the two tasks were separate and not associated, but rather, that 
researchers were interested in individual differences in performance on different memory and 
problem solving tasks.  In addition, participants in the Study Only condition were told that 
they would be given a memory test for the studied lists after they had completed the CRATs.  
This was done in order to avoid demand characteristics in this condition (such demand 
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characteristics were not a concern for participants in the other conditions because they were 
given a memory test before the CRATs).   
Second, all participants were debriefed following the experiment.  One of the 
questions asked was whether they were aware of any link between the memory and problem 
solving tasks.  A relatively large percentage (90%) said they were not aware of any link 
between the two tasks.  Interestingly, when the data from the 10% of participants who 
claimed to be aware of a link between the two tasks was removed from the analyses, we found 
no significant changes in the results.  
Having ruled out a deliberate memory search interpretation of our results, we believe 
that the more parsimonious interpretation of this set of findings lies in an automatic priming 
process, one that is linked to models that incorporate a spreading activation mechanism when 
explaining performance in associative memory and insight-based reasoning tasks.  Indeed, our 
results are consistent with the associative-activation theory of Howe et al. (2009) as well as 
the activation-monitoring theory presented by Roediger and McDermott (1995).  At the core 
of these models is the assumption that false memory illusions are driven by spreading 
activation processes that occur during study.  That faster solution times and higher solution 
rates were produced by participants in the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions is 
predicted because the spread of activation that results from inducing the critical lure primes at 
study is believed to be far greater than the spread of activation that results from presenting 
participants with such items at test (Dewhurst et al., 2009, 2011, 2012; Hancock et al., 2003).  
The notion that encoding processes appear to be the key to facilitating CRAT performance is 
also compatible with findings from previous studies that have investigated whether 
associations at study or at test drive false memory illusions (e.g., Arndt & Reder, 2003; 
Dewhurst et al., 2009, 2011, 2012; McCabe, Presmanes, Robertson, & Smith, 2004; Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995; Roediger et al., 2001a,b).  The general consensus that emerged from 
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such research was that false memory illusions (e.g., those produced by DRM tasks) were the 
result of associations activated during study rather than test.  Additional research (e.g., 
Dewhurst et al., 2009; Coane & McBride, 2006; Marsh & Dolan, 2007) has shown that 
processes that occur at retrieval rarely influence false memories.  The current findings add 
further support to the notion that associations generated during study as opposed to test 
facilitate false memory illusions.   
Although we have focused on effects at encoding it is important to acknowledge that 
there were some effects at test.  Although these were small, presenting participants with the 
critical lures on a recognition test prior to them completing test CRATs did increase solution 
rates and decrease solution times.  These modest changes in problem solving performance 
were anticipated because recognition tests prompt participants to search through their 
memories in order to ascertain whether the presented items are new or previously encountered 
items.  Because such memory searches lead to activation of the corresponding memory 
representations of the items on the recognition test (which in the present study included the 
critical lure primes), such residual activation from test trials is likely to have some priming 
effect on CRAT solution rates and times.  However, as discussed previously, the spread of 
activation that results from having encountered an item at test is thought to be less powerful 
than the spread of activation that results from activating an item at study.  Hence, an effect at 
test, although expected, was predicted to be (and was) much weaker compared to the effects 
seen at study (see Howe et al., 2009). 
The outcomes presented in this article have some important implications.  First, false 
memories have to be sufficiently activated in memory that they can be successfully recalled 
(Howe et al., 2010, 2011) or recognized (Experiments 1 to 2) in order for priming to be 
effective.  Importantly, the current experiments clearly showed that activation during 
encoding can and does facilitate immediate performance on other, non-memory tasks.   
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Second, false memories can effectively prime higher cognitive processes, specifically insight-
based, creative problem solving, across age (i.e., in 11-year-old children and adults).  That is, 
false memory primes can increase both the speed and rate at which problems are solved 
compared with unprimed problem solutions for both children and adults.  This holds not just 
for false memories, but also for memories activated by the presentation of the prime during 
encoding.  Thus, regardless of age, when developmentally appropriate materials are used, 
false memories generated from information presented during encoding can and do facilitate 
performance on other, non-memory cognitive tasks. 
Third, given that we used recognition measures to assess false recollection, whereas 
previous research in this domain used recall measures, the present study extends priming 
effect findings to tests of recognition.  Thus, developmentally invariant priming effects are 
observed across the two principal procedures used to measure memory.  Fourth, this research 
is the first to establish that priming during the study, but not the test, phase is key to 
facilitating CRAT performance.  This finding compliments the existing false memory priming 
effects literature that has routinely shown that false memory illusions are predominantly 
driven by spreading activation processes that occur during study (i.e., encoding – see, 
Dewhurst et al., 2009, 2011, 2012; Howe et al., 2009). 
Fifth, both the current findings and those from previous studies (Howe et al., 2010, 
2011), have extended the range of false memory priming effects by demonstrating that false 
memories can prime complex, higher order tasks and not simply other, related implicit and 
explicit memory tasks.  Such results have considerable relevance to contemporary debates 
regarding the links between remembering and reasoning and the possibility of developing a 
unified model of memory and reasoning processes.  One salient debate concerns the status of 
implicit processes such as intuition in reasoning and problem solving.  Some theorists (e.g., 
Evans, 2010) suggest that intuition may often be a “false friend”, providing rapid, low-effort, 
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default responses that are in fact erroneous.  This negative view can be contrasted with a more 
positive position, whereby implicit forms of processing involving mechanisms such as 
priming can give rise to intuitions that promote successful reasoning and judgment (e.g., 
Gigerenzer, 2007; Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  This latter position concurs with the proposal 
that decisions in the face of complex problems are better left to the cognitive unconscious - 
the so-called “deliberation-without-attention” hypotheses (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; 
Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  This hypothesis is not without controversy (e.g., see Acker, 
2008; Aczel, Lukacs, Komlos, & Aitken, 2011; Ambady, 2010; Lassiter, Lindberg, González-
Vallejo, Bellezza, & Phillips, 2009), with some reporting that conscious thought may still be 
better than unconscious processes (e.g., Huizenga, Wetzels, van Ravenzwaaij, & 
Wagenmakers, 2012) and that there may be some issues concerning key arguments 
surrounding the roles of explicit versus implicit memory in producing advantages from 
supposedly intuitive processing.  Regardless, we believe that our findings regarding false 
memory priming of problem solving usefully inform this controversy, revealing the beneficial 
effects of implicitly derived false memories for effective reasoning with complex insight tasks 
and extending previous research that has revealed beneficial priming of problem solving via 
true memories (e.g., Kokinov, 1990; Schunn & Dunbar, 1996).  
In conclusion, the present research has focused on the positive consequences of false 
memory illusions.  It is clear that false memories like false beliefs (e.g., McKay & Dennett, 
2009) can and do exert beneficial effects upon human cognition, not only in terms of related 
memory tasks but also when it comes to complex problem solving (Howe et al., 2010, 2011; 
McDermott, 1997; McKone & Murphy, 2000).  Moreover, and perhaps of greater 
consequence, priming during encoding facilitates subsequent problem solving performance 
more so than when priming occurs only at test.  That these effects are developmentally 
invariant when age appropriate materials are used is also important because it indicates that 
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for both children and adults, when concepts are present in a participant’s knowledge base, 
spreading activation mechanisms support the formation of spontaneous false memories as 
well as the more creative process of solving insight-based problems.  Hence, memory 
illusions, like memory accuracies, can and do have fitness-relevant adaptive consequences 
regardless of age.   
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Appendix A 
In this Appendix, we report a normative study in which we created a new set of CRAT 
problems specifically for adults.  We did this so we could better control CRAT difficulty and 
use a wider variety of DRM lists than those already available in previously normed CRATs 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003).  
A total of 40 university students participated in this normative experiment.  
Participants were presented with 32 CRATs (see Table A1).  The items on the CRATs all 
required a solution that was a word associated with all three words of the triad through the 
construction of a compound word or common phrase (e.g., glasses, flower, and burn, are 
associated by the common, solution word SUN: SUNglasses, SUNflower and SUNburn).  
Twenty-nine of the CRATs were newly created such that their solutions were also critical 
lures found in the Roediger et al. (2001b) DRM lists.  The three additional problems whose 
solutions were also critical lures on DRM lists were taken from the original Bowden and 
Jung-Beeman (2003) norms.  
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room.  Instructions similar to Bowden 
and Jung-Beeman (2003) were given.  That is, participants were told that they would see three 
items on a computer screen and that they should try and produce a fourth word, which, when 
combined with each of the three items, would make up a common compound word or phrase.  
Participants were first given three demonstrations by the experimenter followed by two 
practice problems prior to the experiment itself.  The three problem words were presented on 
a computer laptop screen simultaneously in a vertical orientation, one above, below, and at 
the centre point.  The participants were given 60 sec (the longest time limit used by Bowden 
and Jung-Beeman was 30 sec) to produce the solution.  If the solution was produced within 
the time limit, both the solution and the solution time were recorded and the next problem was 
presented.  If the participant did not produce the correct response within the time limit, the 
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solution was provided by the experimenter and the program automatically moved on to the 
next problem.  
We present the results for both solution rates and solution times in Table A1.  
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Table A1. New CRAT norms for adults. 
 
CRAT problem 
 
Solution/Critical 
Lure 
% Solved Solution time  
Crust/stale/french bread 93 10.81 (14.86) 
Chase/police/toy car 90 16.48 (19.23) 
Old/hole/super man 88 24.48 (19.14) 
Note/jazz/sheet music 88 15.21 (18.70) 
Post/lava/bulb lamp 85 18.67 (21.25) 
Knitting/pine/work needle 85 18.23 (21.29) 
Salad/bowl/juice fruit 83 22.83 (20.52) 
Haul/jump/bow long 78 26.49 (23.99) 
Band/ball/tyre rubber 73 26.61 (24.20) 
Spa/mental/care health 68 28.84 (24.46) 
Shop/washer/frame window 60 31.49 (24.82) 
Board/mail/magic black 58 33.71 (25.41) 
Base/territorial/boot army 55 37.64 (23.68) 
Pole/national/ship flag 55 32.32 (25.73) 
Flower/friend/scout girl 55 38.56 (21.37) 
Leg/wheel/high chair 53 35.05 (24.89) 
Knife/tip/pal pen 50 38.10 (24.00) 
Drinking/tea/cake cup 48 39.39 (23.43) 
Football/flannel/vest shirt 48 41.27 (22.97) 
School/chair/horse high 43 40.59 (25.23) 
Bank/boat/winding river 40 40.96 (23.92) 
Cleaner/magic/woven carpet 33 48.89 (18.73) 
Skin/tissue/ball soft 33 46.80 (20.39) 
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Stop/wolf/dog whistle 30 47.34 (21.33) 
Bomb/white/alarm smoke 25 50.42 (18.08) 
Tooth/potato/heart sweet 25 48.75 (20.42) 
List/bone/last wish 25 47.35 (22.76) 
Hold/stool/print foot 23 50.63 (19.78) 
Limits/sights/break city 20 51.42 (18.13) 
Walk/over/deep sleep 18 52.87 (17.20) 
Monkey/bite/legs spider 18 53.20 (16.90) 
Cheese/pie/ivy cottage 15 53.12 (17.70) 
Note. Standard Deviations are in parentheses.   
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Appendix B 
The stimuli selected for use with the 11-year-old participants in Experiment 2: the eight DRM 
lists chosen from Stadler et al. (1999) and from the normed associates lists created by Nelson 
et al. (2004), for use in the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions (the critical lure has 
been underlined); the eight corresponding CRAT problems selected from the child normative 
data produced by Howe et al. (2011) for use in all three test conditions (the solution word has 
been underlined and is synonymous to the critical lure of the corresponding DRM list); the 
eight unrelated DRM lists chosen from Stadler et al. (1999) for use in the ‘Test Only’ 
condition. 
Bread 
DRM list: butter, sandwich, jam, milk, flour, jelly, dough, crust, loaf, toast. 
CRAT problem: crumb, knife, stale. 
Cold 
DRM list: hot, snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, chilly, weather, freeze, shiver. 
CRAT problem: water, sore, temperature. 
Fruit 
DRM list: vegetable, citrus, basket, strawberry, kiwi, plum, grape, cherry, lemon, peach. 
CRAT problem: juice, salad, bowl. 
Gold 
DRM list: silver, jewellery, bronze, bracelet, necklace, medal, treasure, brass, metal, shiny. 
CRAT problem: fish, mine, ring. 
Lion 
DRM list: tiger, roar, fierce, mane, jungle, zoo, hunt, Africa, feline, cat. 
CRAT problem: cub, sea, king. 
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Needle 
DRM list: thread, pin, syringe, sharp, point, thimble, thorn, hurt, injection, cloth. 
CRAT problem: sewing, pine, knitting. 
Sweet 
DRM list: sour, sugar, bitter, nice, taste, soda, honey, chocolate, cake, tart. 
CRAT problem: heart, shop, tooth. 
Window 
DRM list: door, glass, pane, curtains, house, sill, open, shutter, view, clear. 
CRAT problem: frame, cleaner, ledge. 
Black 
DRM list: white, dark, cat, charred, night, colour, blue, ink, coal, gray.  
Car 
DRM list: truck, bus, train, vehicle, drive, jeep, race, keys, garage, van. 
Doctor 
DRM list: nurse, sick, medicine, health, hospital, ill, office, stethoscope, surgeon, clinic. 
Music 
DRM list: note, sound, piano, sing, radio, band, melody, concert, instrument, orchestra. 
River 
DRM list: water, stream, lake, boat, tide, swim, flow, barge, creek, brook. 
Sleep 
DRM list: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, snooze, blanket, snore, nap, yawn. 
Smell 
DRM list: nose, breathe, sniff, aroma, hear, see, nostril, scent, fragrance, perfume. 
Spider 
DRM list: web, insect, bug, fright, fly, crawl, tarantula, poison, bite, creepy.  
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Appendix C 
The stimuli selected for use with the adult participants in Experiment 2: the eight DRM lists 
chosen from Stadler et al. (1999) and from the normed associates lists created by Nelson et al. 
(2004), for use in the ‘Study and Test’ and ‘Study Only’ conditions (the critical lure has been 
underlined); the eight corresponding CRAT problems selected from Bowden and Jung-
Beeman (2003) for use in all three test conditions (the solution word has been underlined and 
is synonymous to the critical lure of the corresponding DRM list); the eight unrelated DRM 
lists chosen from Stadler et al. (1999) for use in the ‘Test Only’ condition. 
Apple 
DRM list: core, orchard, pear, pie, fruit, banana, rotten, Newton, cobbler, orange. 
CRAT problem: pine, crab, sauce. 
Coffee 
DRM list: caffeine, tea, café, drip, cup, grind, mug, cream, doughnut, instant. 
CRAT problem: break, bean, cake. 
Foot 
DRM list: walk, hand, toe, kick, sandals, yard, ankle, boot, inch, sock. 
CRAT problem: hold, print, stool. 
Gun 
DRM list: pistol, trigger, weapon, bullet, rifle, shoot, shooting, shot, bang, hunting. 
CRAT problem: fight, control, machine. 
Paper 
DRM list: newsstand, sheet, document, pad, folder, margin, thesis, tissue, staple, notebook. 
CRAT problem: fly, clip, wall. 
 
 
Adaptive Consequences of False Memories 47 
Pen 
DRM list: pencil, write, fountain, quill, felt, Bic, scribble, cross, tip, marker. 
CRAT problem: knife, light, pal. 
Street 
DRM list: avenue, boulevard, road, sidewalk, alley, curb, lane, crossing, corner, pavement. 
CRAT problem: main, sweeper, light. 
Tree 
DRM list: oak, sap, stump, leaf, bush, forest, elm, branch, leaves, moss. 
CRAT problem: palm, shoe, house. 
Black 
DRM list: white, dark, cat, charred, night, colour, blue, ink, coal, gray.  
Car 
DRM list: truck, bus, train, vehicle, drive, jeep, race, keys, garage, van. 
Doctor 
DRM list: nurse, sick, medicine, health, hospital, ill, office, stethoscope, surgeon, clinic. 
Music 
DRM list: note, sound, piano, sing, radio, band, melody, concert, instrument, orchestra. 
River 
DRM list: water, stream, lake, boat, tide, swim, flow, barge, creek, brook. 
Sleep 
DRM list: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, snooze, blanket, snore, nap, yawn. 
Smell 
DRM list: nose, breathe, sniff, aroma, hear, see, nostril, scent, fragrance, perfume. 
Spider 
DRM list: web, insect, bug, fright, fly, crawl, tarantula, poison, bite, creepy. 
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Footnotes 
1
 Because it is not clear that such models can account for reasoning-remembering 
dependencies observed in the false-memory, problem-solving literatures being considered 
here, or at least not as easily as theories based on spreading activation mechanisms, they will 
not be considered further in this article. 
2
 We identified that one of the child-normed CRATs was performing at ceiling (> .80; see 
Table 1).  This main effect of age was no longer significant (p > .05) when we ran analyses 
that controlled for this ceiling effect. 
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Table 1.  The mean solution rates (%) for the adult- and child-normed CRATs. 
Adults Children 
CRAT Mean Solution Rate (%) CRAT Mean Solution Rate (%) 
BREAD 69 APPLE 50 
COLD 66 COFFEE 58 
FRUIT 60 FOOT 58 
GOLD 63 GUN 33 
LION 71 PAPER 75 
NEEDLE 76 PEN 50 
SUN 61 TABLE 49 
SWEET 29 TREE 79 
WINDOW 83
*
 STREET 57 
*
At ceiling (> 80%)
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Figure 1. Mean CRAT solution rates (proportions) as a function of priming (primed vs. 
unprimed) and condition (Study and Test vs. Study Only vs. Test Only), with 95% confidence 
interval error bars for Experiment 1. 
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Figure 2.  Mean CRAT solution rates (proportions) as a function of priming (primed vs. 
unprimed) and condition (Study and Test vs. Study Only vs. Test Only), with 95% confidence 
interval error bars for Experiment 2. 
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Figure 3.  Mean CRAT solution times (seconds) as a function of priming (primed vs. 
unprimed) and condition (Study and Test vs. Study Only vs. Test Only), with 95% confidence 
interval error bars for Experiment 2. 
